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With the advent of the Internet, the emphasis of communication policies has 
moved from the regulation of telephone networks to the unbundling regulation to 
enforce sharing of network elements. Since unbundling is often impeded by the 
renegotiation by incumbents over the control of essential facilities, it would be 
advisable to separate the company that owns local loop (LoopCo). Recently the 
number of subscribers of DSL in Japan has grown phenomenally due to the 
unbundling regulation. This suggests that unbundling can accelerate the 
proliferation of broadband, but this lesson cannot be easily generalized to other 
countries, because the success depends on the special conditions such as 
extremely low pricing of entrants and strategic mistakes of NTT that neglected 
DSL. If the unbundling regulation succeeds in increasing competition, the 
telecommunications industry in the narrow sense will shrink, making the universal 
services of telephone network increasingly difficult. 
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Once it was argued that Japan was lagging behind western countries in embracing the Internet 
because the telephone charges of NTT (Nippon Telegraph & Telephone) was high, which 
were the main focus of U.S.-Japan Trade Negotiations. However, since 2001 the subscribers 
to broadband connection has grown so rapidly in Japan that it now has the greatest number of 
DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) subscribers in the world, while the telephone charge is still 
high. Nevertheless, debates about the interconnection fee are still going on; this suggests that 
the changes facing the communication industry are little understood. In the history of 
telecommunication, the change we are now facing is the most revolutionary one ever since the 
invention of telephone by Alexander Graham Bell. The innovations occurring now are 
comparable to the institutional change of substituting electrical power for steam power, rather 
than enhancing the performance of steam engines. 
During the 1980’s, when incumbent telephone operators were divided or privatized in 
many countries, starting with the divestiture of AT&T (American Telephone & Telegraph), an 
important issue was the regulation of access charge that would enhance competition between 
incumbents and the new entrants. Although the technological environment changed 
completely as a result of the rapid spread of the Internet in the latter half of the 1990s, 
telephone regulations were readjusted by the 1996 Telecommunications Act in the U.S. and 
the reshaping of NTT with holding company was effected in 1997 in Japan. In particular, 
Japan’s institutional arrangement was done with unfortunate timing because it divided NTT,  
imitating the divestiture of AT&T, along with the structure of telephone networks. Since NTT 
was divided into a long-distance company (NTT Communications) and two regional 
companies (NTT East and West), regional companies are heavily regulated and banned from 
conducting business connecting multiple prefectures, thus NTT’s core network was divided 
into many “islands” of closed networks.   
As Japan is the first major country that experience the transition from the telephone to the 
Internet, it would set the precedent for other counties to manage the transition. In order to 
overcome this period without confusion, it is necessary to prioritize the policies and map out a 
set of consistent strategies. Since the most important objective of communication policy is to 
migrate from telephone networks to the Internet smoothly; short-term issues such as tariff 
regulation must be subordinate to this long-term target. The focus of conventional research in 
telecommunication regulation has been calculation of optimal charges by applying 
neoclassical microeconomics. These theories can analyze the efficiency under the given 
regime, but they cannot compare the efficiency of different regimes. In this paper, I analyze 
the effectiveness and social cost of unbundling regulations using new tools such as game 
theory and contract theory, and examine how the regulation should be enforced. In Section 1, 
the historical significance of the Internet is considered, and in Section 2, its technical aspect is 
explained. In Section 3, the negotiation problems accompanying the sharing of infrastructures 
and the significance of the regulation measures are defined in economic terms. In Section 4, 
based on the experience of Japan where DSL has shown a rapid surge in popularity, the 
effects and costs of the unbundling regulations are investigated. Finally, the future challenges 
facing the practice of unbundling are summarized. Those who know the Internet technology 
and interested in Japan’s case can begin from Section 4. 
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1. The Internet as a General-Purpose Technology 
 
The Internet is a general-purpose technology (GPT) that does not in itself serve any purpose 
but enable other technologies to innovate, much like electric power and steam engines. In fact 
the Internet is not a network but only an abbreviation of the concept of “internetworking” that 
connects LANs around the world with a simple protocol called TCP/IP (Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol). It is historically observed that it takes a number of decades for 
new GPT to have a wider effect on society. In the 1870s Thomas Edison invented the light 
bulb and electric power plants started to be built across the U.S. However, it was not until 
around 1920 that the energy produced by these plants exceeded the energy produced by steam 
engines in the manufacturing industry. If the advent of microprocessors (1971) is considered 
as the starting point of the IT (information technology), the diffusion rate of its domestic 
application is almost the same as that of electric power (Fig. 1). With regard to the Internet, if 
its starting point is set to be 1983 when TCP/IP was authorized as the formal standard of 
ARPANET (a predecessor of the Internet), the influence of the Internet can be seen to be 
increasing at almost the same rate as that of microprocessor. It is only now, however, that the 
Internet and the computer are beginning to exert a more profound change in society, as both 





Fig. 1 The diffusion rates of electric power and IT in U.S. homes 
(Jovanovic-Rousseau 2003) 
 
The cost of manufacturing semiconductors has continued to fall rapidly since the invention of 
the integrated circuit in 1960 in accordance with Moore’s law (which states that the cost will 
halve every 18 months), to the extent that it is now (per computing power) a hundred 
millionth of what it was 40 years ago (Nordhaus 2002). The prices of computers have dropped 
similarly, but telephone charges are only 1/20 of what they were 40 years ago. 
Telecommunication is an equipment-intensive industry with the cost of the telephone 
exchange (a kind of computer) alone constituting half of the investment. Although the  4 
construction and maintenance costs of telephone circuits do not decrease as rapidly as those of 
semiconductor circuits, there might be a cost margin of tens of thousands times
2. During the 
“IT bubble,” newly established carriers invested heavily in dedicated lines and long-haul in 
the hope of making up this margin, but the access lines remained a monopoly of the 
incumbents. As a consequence, new carriers were unable to use the vast excess capacities that 
they had created, and were forced to go out of business. It is often observed historically that 
new GPT is unable to “take off” long after its invention. The reason might be complicated, 
but Aghion-Howitt (1998) draw several conclusions using numerical simulations. 
Firstly, if the new GPT is a substitute of the existing technology, its growth will be held 
back because it will make old technology worthless. It is ironical that the telephone industry, 
which invented transistors, was the last industry to adopt them. While all computers were 
made of transistors in 1950s, it was in the 1980s that digital electronic exchanges made of 
transistors became widespread, replacing mechanical crossbar switchboards. 
Secondly, if the social learning by “experiments” in the early stages is difficult, it will take 
a long time to introduce a new GPT. The experiments conducted by early adopters are not 
likely succeed until they become the majority, but it is difficult to be a majority without 
experiments. As the network externality of GPT is large, such coordination failure often 
occurs, which cannot be mitigated by price mechanisms
3. 
The last point is that “killer applications” and technical standards are necessary for a GPT 
to spread. In the case of electric power, the motors played an important role; in the case of the 
Internet, the WWW achieved the same end. If various communication protocols flood the 
market, the technological uncertainty is greater and the economy of scale is limited; therefore 
the industry standard should be established to accept the new GPT. 
The price of computers did not fall much while IBM monopolized the market for 
mainframes, even though the cost of manufacturing semiconductors went down. Since the 
CPU and OS of the IBM-PC introduced to the market in 1981 were out-sourced to Intel and 
Microsoft, many “PC clones” (third party’s computers compatible with IBM-PC), came onto 
the market, giving rise to an increased competition, with the result that the computing power 
of laptop computers currently in use is greater than that of mainframe computers in 1980s. 
Since it is the subscriber line that causes a bottleneck in communications, the first best 
measure is the facility-based competition in the market similar to that of IBM-PC and clones. 
However, in the case of telecommunications, the investment in facilities required to lay 
subscriber lines across the country is very great, and acts as a barrier to a truly competitive 
market. The unbundling regulation aims at resolving this problem by having different 
communications systems share the existing subscriber line. 
 
2. What Is Unbundling? 
 
Layered Structure of the Internet 
The most remarkable feature of TCP/IP is that, since the protocol is defined only by software, 
the physical facilities are abstracted so that the information carried over the Internet is 
independent of hardware. Referring to the seven-layer model of OSI (Open Systems 
                                                  
2  “Gildar’s law” (Gilder 2000), that bandwidth doubles annually, is also believed to apply to optical fibers. 
3  Coordination failure is a state in which Pareto-inferior equilibrium is chosen in a game with multiple equilibria 
because it is a Nash equilibrium when the strategies are complementary (Cooper 1999).  5 
Interconnection) used in the communication (Fig. 2), TCP specifies the 4
th layer (transport), 
IP specifies the 3
rd layer (network), and the physical and datalink layers come under no 
particular specifications
4. In the initial stage of Internet development the physical layer was 
the mini-computer and the datalink layer the dedicated line, whereas when the Internet is used 
via dial-up connection, the two layers are the personal computer and the telephone line 
respectively. The Internet can connect such physically different networks if only they are both 

















Fig. 2 Seven-layer model of OSI 
 
In the circuit switching of PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network), lines are physically 
switched by telephone exchanges centrally, controlling all the layers and guaranteeing the 
bandwidth by establishing a connection between terminals in advance, therefore protocols 
must be matched for all the layers in order to make a connection between different networks. 
In contrast, a TCP/IP connection uses a packet switching system whereby the data is 
encapsulated in a packet and the packet is relayed to the address written in the header thereof 
without the necessity of establishing connections
5. This system is simple and economical but 
lacks reliability because the route and bandwidth cannot be guaranteed, so it had not been 
considered appropriate for commercial data communications that require a high reliability. 
Thus the Internet remained an experimental protocol for academic and research purposes for 
nearly 20 years after it was first proposed in the early 1970s. 
However, with the launch of the distributed database WWW (World Wide Web) in which 
data is mutually linked by means of HTML (Hypertext Markup Language) in 1991, the 
Internet exploded in popularity assisted by NCSA Mosaic browser that appeared in 1993. The 
reason for the tremendous growth in TCP/IP’s popularity lies in the abstraction of the physical 
                                                  
4  TCP is a dispensable protocol that incorporates confirmation of successful transmission. In cases such as 
multicasting involving one-directional transmission, UDP (User Datagram Protocol), which does not confirm 
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5  Among packet switching systems, in addition to datagram systems like TCP/IP, there are virtual-circuit 
systems whereby a connection is established between terminals logically such as the ATM (Asynchronous 
Transfer Mode) and frame relay. ATM, however, has a centralized structure similar that used by telephones 








1 Physical  6 
layer. As for TV, for example, it is necessary for people to buy new TV receivers for TV to be 
popular, whereas in the case of the Internet, all that is required is to install the TCP/IP 
software in the network. From 1995, when Windows 95 supported TCP/IP as a default 
communication protocol, the numbers of people using the Internet increased from the 
hundreds of thousands to the hundreds of millions in a few years. The reason for this is that 
BBS (Bulletin Board System) operators such as AOL, supported TCP/IP, and millions of  
BBS users across the world have joined the Internet without knowing it. As a result, the 
network and transport layers were standardized by TCP/IP and the datalink layer by Ethernet; 
now that even the description of other protocols has been deleted from textbooks of networks 
(Tanenbaum 2002). 
Even if the communication protocol is independent of physical layers, telephone carriers 
can control the information carried over their networks by controlling equipment. For 
example, in the 1950s, a suit was brought against AT&T that forbade the mounting of a 
plastic cup on a telephone handset, and the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) 
banned AT&T from controlling “foreign attachments.” With reference to how computer data 
flowing in communication networks should be controlled, starting in 1966, the FCC 
conducted  Computer Inquiries that were conducted three times. The conclusion of the 
Computer I in 1973 recommended that data communications should be separated from 
telephone services and the former should be operated by “maximally separated subsidiaries” 
of telephone carriers. Upon the conclusion of the Computer II in 1982, the year of AT&T 
divestiture, data services was broadly defined as enhanced services so as to allow new carriers 
to provide data services without permission of AT&T. The Computer III, concluded in 1986, 
recommended the development of ONA (Open Network Architecture) that makes it 
mandatory for the incumbent to provide open interconnection without imposing the 
requirement that the data company should be a subsidiary
6. As a result of unbundling the 
basic services (telephone) and the enhanced services, the telephone regulations were not 
applied to enhanced services and incumbents were banned from laying telephone access 
charges on ISPs. 
The above measures were included in the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996, in which 
following regulations were also introduced: the asymmetric regulation of AT&T was  
abolished in effect; ILECs (Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers) were allowed to consolidate; 
key network elements such as switchboards and copper wire were classified as UNEs 
(Unbundled Network Elements). It has been made mandatory for the ILECs to open their 
UNE-P (UNE-Platform) to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs), resulting in CLECs 
being able to share the subscriber line, and advancing the introduction of the DSL. The 
Telecommunications Business Law enacted in 1985 in Japan classified telecommunication 
business into two categories; the type I that owns facilities and the type II that operates over 
other carrier’s line. But NTT did not initially support TCP/IP, and the MPT (Ministry of Post 
and Telecommunications) delayed authorization of an Internet service
7. The introduction of 
TCP/IP was similarly delayed in Europe because government-owned telephone operators 
stuck to the specifications defined by the ITU (International Telecommunication Union) such 
                                                  
6  Although ONA defines the interconnection of data according to OSI, it seldom functions as such; TCP/IP has 
consequently played a role similar to that of ONA (Noam 2001: pp.179ff). 
7  The MPT did not receive the application from IIJ (Internet Initiative Japan) as a special type II carrier for more 
than a year after it was founded (in 1992) as Japan’s first ISP.  7 
as ISDN and X.25
8. 
In the circuit switching of PSTN, the lines are connected only when a call is being made; 
the Internet is packet switching by which data is switched by packets while the physical lines 
remain connected. Initially, however, most individual users of the Internet connected with 
dial-up that allows the user to connect with the Internet through a telephone line. This is an 
irregular service whereby the signals are switched by telephone exchanges and switched again 
by routers. Since the processing power of the current personal computers is much higher than 
that of mini-computers in the 1970s, a considerable cost could be reduced by bypassing PSTN 
and connect routers directly. But since the bandwidth of a telephone line (64 kbps) is not 
sufficient, DSL sends data using high frequencies that are not used by human voice. That is, 
the significance of DSL lines lies in their always-on connection, whereby computers are 
connected directly, rather than the breadth of the band. 
 
Facility-Based Competition and Line Sharing 
PSTN can be replaced by an IP network that sends voice by VoIP (Voice over IP). If 
broadband services continue to grow at the present pace in Japan, the number of IP users will 
overtake that of telephone users within 5 years. Thus rapid shift to the IP network is much 
more important than lowering of telephone charges. However, the fact remains that while the 
optical fiber necessary for such a development is available in almost 100% of the regions 
throughout the country, the utilization of the optical fiber is currently no greater than 10%. 
This is because the bottleneck of the last mile of subscriber lines does not allow for an 
increase in traffic. Competition between the IP network and the PSTN can only take place 
once this bottleneck has been dissolved. 
It is the first best to enable facility-based competition in which each competitor has a 
physical access lines different from that of the incumbents. The medium that has the greatest 
potential for such an alternative access lines is that of the radio. The cellular telephone is 
currently replacing the landline telephone, but this development comes at high cost and the 
mobile telephone industry is more oligopolistic than landlines. The reason for this is not 
technology but lies in the inefficient allocation of radio spectrum. Since the cellular 
communication system and frequency hopping (used by wireless LAN) were invented in the 
1940s, if the UHF band had been opened for communications instead of broadcasting, the 
bottleneck of the last mile might have been solved long ago (Huber 1997).   
Since radio equipment is made by semiconductors, rapid technological breakthroughs and 
further cost reductions will take place according to Moore’s law; thus a high speed 
communication of over 100 Mbps can be realized at a cost far lower than that of optical fiber 
with new digital radio technologies such as IEEE802.11a and UWB (Ultra Wide Band). In 
reality, however, it is difficult to move the frequencies that are owned by existing licensees, 
resulting in a situation where the highly efficient radio technology can only be used in narrow 
bands under inferior conditions. Using these next-generation digital radio technologies, 
communication can be multiplexed without dividing frequencies. Therefore it is necessary to 
implement a radical reform of the spectrum policy so that a wide range of frequencies can be 
opened without license requirement (Ikeda 2002). 
                                                  
8  Sweden experienced an exceptionally early popularization of the Internet because there was a “loophole” of 
regulation through which other carriers were able to access telephone lines using different protocols 
(Glimstedt-Zander 2003).  8 
In order to create an environment where facility-based competition can occur in the field of 
landline communication, it is important to open the rights of way, such as utility poles and 
common use tunnels. Since the regulations of the rights of way are complicated and belong to 
a number of government offices in Japan, it is necessary to consolidate regulations and 
simplify their procedures. With regard to this matter, there is a strong desire from overseas 
telecommunication carriers to push this improvement forward, but the competition by 
installation of their own lines would not be so great except for leased lines for corporations. 
This is due to the fact that the cost of installing the subscriber line for individual residential 
premises is enormous. Therefore in the current environment, it is unlikely that facility-based 
competition in the field of landline communications will occur
9.  
As a second-best basis, it would be practical to promote competition over the datalink layer 
or above by sharing the physical layer of incumbents. Among the network elements of PSTN, 
dark fiber (optical fiber without multiplexers) and dry copper (copper wires without telephone 
exchanges) can also be used by IP networks, and the life span of these conduits can be 
extended for decades if appropriately maintained while switches (exchanges and routers) 
depend on the specific services. So unbundling regulation aims at separating conduits from 
switches and share conduits by many services. There are two methods: firstly, new carriers 
install new subscriber lines separate from the MDFs (Main Distributing Frames) used in 
telephone offices; secondly, entrants use the subscriber lines already installed (line sharing). 
Most DSL carriers adopt the second scenario for residential subscribers. As is shown in Fig. 3, 
this system involves a subscriber line which is split for voice and data by different frequency, 












Fig. 3 Co-location and line sharing 
 
                                                  
9  Facility-based competitors, such as Usen Broad Networks, have appeared in the optical fiber communications 
in Japan, but they are only able to offer services limited to urban areas with a subscriber of only a few tens of 
thousands of households. 
10  The figure is a simplification; in fact, the subscriber line is branched by an HDF (splitter in the telephone 













DSLAM  9 
In this method it is necessary for entrants to install the equipment such as DSLAM in the 
incumbent’s offices, but naturally incumbents would not welcome it. Thus the government is 
generally expected to enforce incumbents to permit co-location of competitors’ equipment in 
the telephone offices. The 1996 Telecommunications Act established conditions whereby 
ILECs are forbidden from denying co-location and line sharing. In Japan, in an amendment to 
the Telecommunications Business Law that was enacted in 1997, a reasonable access to 
“specified telecommunication equipment” was made compulsory, and it was decided to make 
interconnection account independent from incumbent’s other business. In Europe, the 
guidelines of local loop unbundling (LLU) were determined by an EU Commission in 2000. 
 
3. Effects and Limits of Regulation 
 
Limits of Unbundling Regulation 
Although the regulation that enforces sharing of physical layers in the way described above is 
good for promoting competition, it would infringe the incumbent’s property rights. So it is 
inevitable that the incumbents will employ every means at their disposal to resist the 
enforcement of this regulation. It is likely that a holdup problem will occur, in which 
incumbents dig in for ex-post renegotiation with their competitors, taking advantage of the 
monopoly over subscriber line that is considered as an essential facility. For example, even if 
the ILEC drew up a contract permitting the CLEC to install its DSLAM in its telephone 
offices, the ILEC may ask for an additional construction cost, saying that the cost was for 
exceptional construction expenses, after the CLEC has already invested in the equipment, or 
the ILEC may refuse to permit its racks to be used by the CLEC, claiming that the racks were 
not included in the UNEs. After which, if the government passes regulation for the racks to be 
included in the UNEs, the ILEC would try to extend the ex-post renegotiations indefinitely, 
saying that the cooling equipment was not an UNE, etc. In the U.S., the ILECs delayed the 
provision of access to their services by means of such holdup, with the result that almost all of 
the numerous CLECs dedicated to the growth of DSL that appeared in the bubble period of 
Internet expansion had run into business difficulties by around 2000. 
The reason for such difficulties lies in the technological characteristic that the subscriber 
line has a strong complementarity with other equipment, so that entrants possessing all of the 
pieces of equipment except for the subscriber line cannot conduct their business if they are 
not allowed access to the subscriber line. As such, if the incumbent owns the essential facility 
for other complementary system, it can inflict damage on the entrants by holdup, dissuading 
the other party to enter into the business at all. Since complicated assets such as 
communications equipment includes almost indefinite subjects open to renegotiation, it is 
impossible to write a complete contract that takes all of the possible contingencies into 
consideration, thus no regulation can eliminate the incidence of holdups in the future
11. 
The enforcement of unbundling regulations intends to mitigate the complementarity that 
brings about holdup problems by modularizing network elements. In PSTN, the 
administration has to intervene in every part of the network in order to guarantee the equal 
access because the exchanges and subscriber lines are integrated; in DSL, if the exchange and 
                                                  
11  It is not theoretically obvious whether holdup problems cannot be eliminated by complete contracts, but this 
issue falls outside the scope of the current paper. For a standard explanation of incomplete contract theory, see 
Hart (1995).  10 
the MDF are unbundled, since the former is no longer essential, only the latter require 
supervision and the rest can be left to competition. An important goal of regulatory reform is 
the reduction of discretionary intervention by the administration. Considering from this 
standpoint, a system that guarantees the effectiveness of regulations (contracts) with 
transparent criteria, the equal access to UNE-P, is reasonable. 
The unbundling regulation encourages the investment of competitors by making entry 
easier, while it discourages investment of incumbents by admitting entrant’s “free riding” on 
incumbent’s facilities. Therefore it is not clear a priori which effect will be greater. If, as in 
the U.S., CLECs don’t have enough capital and the ILECs don’t make sufficient investment 
for fear of regulatory taking, i.e., ex-post renegotiation by government, the growth of the 
broadband network would be delayed (Sidak-Spulber 1998). If free-riding becomes easy, the 
entrant’s incentives of facility-based competition might be weaken. The consequence of this 
would be that the old infrastructures would be fixed by “parasitic competition,” where a 
number of operators are dependent on the incumbent’s facilities
12. The FCC has recently 
changed its policy so that the unbundling regulation is abolished for new equipment, such as 
optical fibers, and investment is promoted
13. 
 
Techniques of Regulation 
Thus renegotiation cannot be completely eliminated by regulation because, as long as both 
parties are sharing the same subscriber line, one party can always execute the holdup on an 
item that has not been defined by regulation in advance. In order to guarantee the equal access 
and supervise opportunistic behavior, it may be necessary to separate the organization of the 
DSL department from that of the telephone department of incumbents in addition to 
separating the equipment. Various regulations of particular countries differ considerably in 
their concrete execution methods. Nevertheless, the following three kinds of partitioning can 
generally be considered in a broad classification of regulation methods. 
 
-  Complete divestiture: separate the capital ownership of a company that possesses local 
loop (LoopCo) and the companies that operate services completely. 
 
-  Corporate separation: separate the corporate bodies into LoopCo and service operators but 
capital ownership need not be separated. 
 
-  Accounting separation: do not divide the corporate body, but make the accounting system 
relating to the connection an independent entity. 
 
Of the above, the complete divestiture is rare among ordinary competition policies; examples 
are found only in the case of Standard Oil in the 19th century and in the case of AT&T in the 
1980s. In the U.S., when the ILEC runs enhanced services such as DSL, corporate separation 
is adopted; other cases adopt account separation. Europe, fundamentally, adopts the account 
                                                  
12  At the end of the 1990s, the controversy about opening CATV facilities was argued. The focus was the 
FCC’s unregulation policy that the unbundling was not made mandatory in fields where CATV was facing the 
facility-based competition with DSL (Oxman 1999). 
13  The FCC decided to abolish the unbundling regulations of optical fibers and the regulations of line sharing of 
subscriber lines in February 2003. This decision led to confusion, since the definition of part of the UNEs had 
been entrusted to state governments.  11 
separation. In Japan, when NTT regional companies carry out the services of DSL, the 
account separation is enforced; when NTT Communications conducts the connection to DSL, 
a separate company makes the connection. It is odd that the DSL function is doubly supported 
within the NTT group and the techniques of regulation are different for these two cases. 
As long as the ownership remains under one roof, the parent company of the telephone 
department can practice unfair competition measures by favoring the DSL subsidiary with 
internal compensation. This situation also gives rise to a conflict of interest, such as the 
intentional retardation of the opening of the telephone department, for fear that the revenue of 
the telephone department might be cannibalized by DSL services. Therefore, in order to 
guarantee fair competition, capital divestiture that serves to completely separate the telephone 
and DSL operators might be desirable. However, divestiture reduces the LoopCo to mere 
facility-leasing company, undermining its investment incentive. The problem of facilities 
being improperly maintained and suffering from deterioration as a result of the employment 
of this kind of separation is often pointed out in the case of the British Railway network. With 
regard to the recent power failure affecting the U.S., it was criticized that the investment made 
in the power grid was reduced to too little, resulting in the equipment deteriorating, because 
the electric power generation and transmission industry was unbundled by regulation and the 
power grid is strongly regulated without enough compensation for building. 
If network elements that have been developed integrally are forcibly separated, the 
development of services integrated with the infrastructure will become more difficult. This 
kind of problem was discussed in the antitrust suit that was enacted by the U.S. Department of 
Justice against Microsoft. The resulting consent decree in 2001 has made it mandatory for 
Microsoft to disclose API (Application Program Interface) in exchange for the company not 
having to undergo the structural separation
14. When there is a competition with other 
platforms, the company has an incentive to become a majority by opening its technology. 
However, once this technology has become the de facto standard, the company can squeeze 
out rival manufacturers by integrating its applications. In other words, with loose unbundling, 
systematic innovation becomes easy when the “boundary of business” shifts, but the holdup 
problem using the monopoly power is likely to occur; thus it is important to disclose interface 
information used in the combining of elemental technologies in order to guarantee the 
impartiality of the platform while maintaining a degree of freedom in the field of 
technological development. 
In the telecommunication industry, too, it is not always efficient to separate the first and 
second layers by regulation. For example, in the new architecture called RENA
15  that NTT is 
developing, the first through fourth layers are integrated and the IP routing is done by optical 
switch. In this case, if a corporation that provides the communication services cannot control 
the infrastructure, development of an integrated service and its maintenance may become 
difficult. One can observe the following cycle: when a new service like the “i-mode” created 
by NTT DoCoMo is being established, it is necessary to make a large investment by 
combining facilities and services; when the market has matured and competitors appear, the 
                                                  
14  Note that since the source code of API was undisclosed and the only documents were opened by the terms of 
the settlement of the Microsoft suit, the transparency was insufficient. 
15  The abbreviation for Resonant Communication Network Architecture. Technically, it is called GMPLS 
(Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching), a technology whereby, when an IP packet is transmitted by 
means of light, the packet is “labeled” and switched by the wavelength. Transmission efficiency is improved by 
the all-optical routing in the core networks.  12 
interface is standardized and modularization thereof occurs (Christensen et al. 2002). Once 
MPHPT (Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Post, and Telecommunications) 
regarded the i-mode as “closed” and tried to enforce asymmetric regulation, but before long 
the browsers of other competitor became compatible with the i-mode (C-HTML) and the 
problem was solved. Similarly, pressured by the mounting competition with the open-source 
operating system Linux, Microsoft admitted governments and academics to view the source 
code of Windows based on the “shared source” contract. If the interface information is 
standardized and the competition (outside option) exists with regard to the infrastructure, even 
when a renegotiation arises, other parties can choose a different infrastructure, and thus the 
holdup problem is mitigated. 
If technologies have strong complementarity and coordination over the whole system is 
required, the forced separation of an organization would lead to a loss of efficiency. Since 
equipment of PSTN has been developed as a whole and matured technologically, it is difficult 
to decompose it into elemental technologies. So the present regulation that allows incumbents 
to manage PSTN integrally and to interconnect other carriers with local telephone exchanges 
may be reasonable. In contrast, if the technology is modularized and the complementarity is 
weak, it is better to separate the element technologies and farm them out, which enables them 
to be manufactured with strong incentive in the market (Holmstrom-Milgrom 1991). In the 
case of the Internet, since the data is encapsulated by the protocol that has been internationally 
standardized, it is easy to unbundle network elements and separate the organization without 
causing efficiency to deteriorate. Indeed, the de-integration would prevent the “big business 
disease” and promote free innovation. 
Therefore intermediate managerial forms, such as the introduction of a consolidated 
subsidiary, would be desirable. Of the factors that determine the boundary of a business 
enterprise, the measurement cost of the business performance as well as the ownership of the 
assets are important considerations. Even when the ownership of the business enterprise is in 
the hands of one group, the incentive can be strengthened if the financial statements of a 
subsidiary is independent and disclosed (Holmstrom 1999). Moreover, as a means of 
minimizing the object of regulations, dividing the companies’ corporate body makes sense. It 
is more efficient to supervise the neutrality of the interface than to separate ownership when 
competition is based on an open standard; if the regulation is limited to the LoopCo, the 
operators would like to separate service subsidiaries voluntarily. In fact, several major carriers 
throughout the world, including AT&T and BT (British Telecom), have divided their 
wholesale and retail departments voluntarily. Since such disintegration also increases the 
efficiency, the promotion of “voluntary unbundling” would be wise for both the government 
and the incumbents. 
 
4. Japan’s Experience 
 
The Success of DSL 
The unbundling regulations passed in the U.S. and Europe have not produced the expected 
results. In the U.S., “high-speed connection” of over 200 kbps has reached about 20 million 
lines (10% of the total), and DSL networks have been introduced to 6.5 million households, 
95% of which are being run by ILECs (FCC 2003). In Europe, broadband service has reached 
about 17 million lines (9% of the total), 70% of which are received through the incumbents’ 
DSL networks. The lines that have been unbundled by LLU account for only 5% of the total  13 
(ECTA 2003). In Japan, on the other hand, DSL users numbered just over 10,000 households 
at the beginning of 2001, and have reached a figure more than 9 million households in a 
period of less than three years. In addition, the largest DSL carrier is Softbank BB (with about 
three million households), whereas the NTT regional companies (East and West) account for 
less than 40% of the total. The diffusion rate of broadband, including cable Internet services, 
has exceeded 20%, resulting in Japan being recognized as “the world’s No. 1 broadband 
country” by the ITU
16. 
Although it is clear that this achievement is largely a result of the unbundling regulations 
passed in an amendment to the Telecommunications Business Law in 1997, it is also true that 
there are many other factors peculiar to Japan that have also contributed to the success of the 
broadband network. Of these, the greatest single factor is that Softbank started selling its DSL 
service at a price so low as to be without precedent in the world. In 2001, the ISP (Internet 
Service Provider) charged the customer about 2,000 yen/month and the dial-up charge of NTT 
cost about 3,000 yen/month; Softbank realized a transmission speed of 8 Mbps, which was 
more than 100 times higher than that of the dial-up transmission speed, for 2,830 yen/month 
(including the ISP charge), almost half of the charge incurred by the dial-up connection. It is 
unusual pricing compared with that of the U.S. that ranges from $40 to $50 at a speed of 512 
kbps.  
Such bargain price is possible due to the great cost reduction by DSL. A telephone 
exchange costs hundreds of millions of yen, but a DSLAM costs only a few million yen. 
Softbank, one of the biggest holding companies of dot-com stocks, has invested more than 
180 billions in the DSL. It was called the “last gamble” of Masayoshi Son, Softbank’s 
president, because the stock price of the company has fallen to only one per cent of its peak 
recorded in the midst of the bubble years. Although Son initially predicted that the DSL 
business would be profitable at the level of 2 million subscribers, Softbank still records 
deficits exceeding 80 billion yen annually after the number of DSL subscribers has surpassed 
3 millions. Son insists that his investment is sustainable because it has been financed with the 
cash raised by selling stocks of Yahoo! etc, unlike the CLECs in the U.S. who raised their 
funds with large debts. However, as big competitors like NTT has lowered their prices to 
almost the same level of Softbank, it is not clear how long this “war of attrition” in which no 
company is making profit can be sustained.   
Another factor in the success of Japan’s broadband service is the asymmetric regulation of 
NTT. Not only subscriber lines but the optical fiber of the long-haul has been categorized as 
“special telecommunication equipment” to which NTT should permit its competitor’s 
connection. In addition, the charges for these conduits have been regulated at the world’s 
lowest levels
17, which has enabled the DSL carriers to build their networks without building 
their own equipment. Especially Softbank built the low-cost core network using Gigabit 
Ethernet
18 over the dark fiber leased from NTT on a national scale, reducing the equipment 
cost by a factor of hundreds. Since other competitors followed Softbank, NTT’s generous 
                                                  
16  According to the ITU (2003), South Korea claims the world’s No. 1 diffusion rate (21.3%) as of 2002, but 
most of the DSLs in Korea are low-speed (512 kbps). Japan has the world’s lowest charges per bit rate. 
17  The charge for sharing subscriber lines is 168 yen/month per circuit, with charges for dark fiber being 5,500 
yen/month per circuit for subscriber lines and 3.9 yen/month for the trunk network (as of October 2003). 
18  Ordinary Ethernet can connect no more than a local site, but Gigabit Ethernet, optical network with the speed 
of 1 Gbps, can connect the sites that are located farther than 1000km. Softbank was one of the first operators that 
deployed Gigabit Ethernet in a national scale, which nobody had believed to work initially.  14 
policy of opening its facilities proved an expensive mistake, not only because it allowed 
competition with DSL but because NTT lost the largest customers, i.e., other carriers, of 
leased line (ATM Megalink), NTT’s most lucrative business. NTT tried to reverse the 
decision and raise the price, after the competition mounted, without success. 
As has been described above, it is still possible for incumbent to practice holdup even after 
the unbundling regulation has been enforced; indeed, NTT resisted the regulation by 
attempting to delay the deployment of other carrier’s equipment in the telephone offices. 
Allegedly there was a interference with DSL and ISDN because Japan’s ISDN uses high 
frequencies used by DSL. Since the initial interconnection rules did not specify the details of 
line sharing, the DSL carriers were obliged to conduct a long series of “tests” when they 
installed their equipment in the telephone offices. It took more than one year for a carrier to 
start actual business proceedings. The Fair Trade Commission of Japan gave a warning to 
NTT East with regard to the construction of DSL connections in 2001, and Son of Softbank 
presented a strong case for the opening of NTT’s networks at the government IT Strategy 
Council (At the time Jun-ichiro Miyazu, the President of NTT, was also a member of the 
council). NTT has reluctantly opened its telephone offices as a result of these pressures. NTT, 
which had been a government enterprise for a long period, and 46% of whose stocks are still 
held by the government, could not resist the government policy for the “proliferation of ultra 
high-speed Internet services” to protect its shareholder value. 
A “semi-governmental” managerial form like NTT is usually inefficient since it causes a 
conflict of interests; it is unnecessary for a government to hold stocks in a business enterprise 
if it is able to control the behavior of the enterprise with complete contracts (regulations). 
However, if the contract is incomplete (conditions cannot be fully specified by regulation), it 
makes sense for the government to own equipment (or stock) and controls the behavior of the 
management (Hart 2003). Needless to say, in many cases, placing a business enterprise under 
governmental control is not efficient because it lowers incentives of the enterprise. However, 
if coordination failure is serious, nationalization might be effective as a transitional measure 
in order to promote institutional change
19. 
A further factor to be considered is the political one. NTT admitted unbundling in exchange 
for a compression of reduction in the interconnection fee after it became an issue in the 
Japan-U.S. Trade Negotiation of 2000. NTT cooperated in opening its copper lines because it 
placed the emphasis on the development of optical fiber and neglected DSL as a transitional 
technology
20. This strategy was similar to the one NTT adopted when it was privatized in 
1985; the company managed to escape from divestiture by helping the NCCs (New Common 
Carriers) by supplying its human and technological resources. NTT could create an 
environment of “controlled competition” with NCCs, but in the case of DSL, it was NTT’s 
fatal miscalculation that Softbank, over which NTT had no control, broke into the market on a 
massive scale after NTT opened its facilities.   
Since the success of Japan’s broadband has been brought about by such accidental 
                                                  
19  Although the NTT’s largest shareholder is the Ministry of Finance, it has become customary for the Minister 
to refrain from veto. This is similar to the case in which the government holds the preferred (non-voting) stocks 
of a bank and exerts “silent pressure” thereon. In the aftermath of the privatization of BT, the government held a 
single “golden share” that enabled it to exercise a veto. 
20  In Norway, the theory has been advanced that a greater popularization of the DSL network has failed to 
materialize because of the strategies of the government-owned company that owns the infrastructure; the 
company invested heavily in its ISDN network, to the detriment of its DSL network (Spiller-Ulset 2003).  15 
combination of a Softbank’s risky investment and NTT’s strategic mistakes, this lesson 
cannot be generalized easily to other countries. It is doubtful whether their services could run 
as going business concerns in other countries. Moreover, these new carriers have little 
equipment of their own because they have built up their networks over NTT’s infrastructure 
and vulnerable to changes in the regulations and tariffs. This is not good for the long-term 
goal of equal competition based on own facilities. 
Although it is not clear theoretically whether the investment will be encouraged or 
discouraged by unbundling regulation, Japan’s experience shows that the net effect may be 
positive under certain conditions. When a competitor enter with cut-throat charges and huge 
amounts of investment, the incumbent is compelled to invest in the broadband, because 
cannibalization with its own DSL is less damaging than being ate up by rival carriers, thus the 
conflict of interest can be resolved. However, in order to fulfill these conditions, it is 
necessary for a large-scale carrier who have no existing equipment to enter the market. So the 
U.S. and Europe, where incumbents mainly operate DSL, are unlikely to exhibit a rapid 
growth in broadband services, because the incumbents are afraid of cannibalization. In other 
words, the lesson from Japan’s experience is that, to encourage competition, governments had 
better unbundle LoopCo as well as network elements, as I noted above. 
The DSL service of Softbank is bundled with the ISP service and the broadband contents 
are distributed by a cable television system that cannot be viewed from other ISPs. This 
strategy was adopted because it is necessary to take a large risk by vertical integration when a 
service has been built up. However, since the service’s elemental technology is open standard, 
the DSL business does not need to be regulated. Conversely, the same regulations ban NTT 
regional companies from bundling their services. It is advisable to abolish this asymmetrical 
regulation and make the opening of interface information the only thing that is mandatory for 
NTT regional companies. 
 
Collapse of PSTN 
On the other hand, the collapse of the PSTN in Japan has started ahead of all other countries. 
The decrease in the amount of traffic served by PSTN that was initiated due to the 
introduction of cellular telephones has been spurred on by the advent of broadband; in 2002, 
the traffic served by PSTN declined by 28%, and the revenue dropped by 20% compared to 
the previous year. If the telephone business continues to shrink at this rate, it would be 
impossible to run a profitable landline business outside of the metropolitan areas. In other 
countries, VoIP is provided only in long-haul via local exchange, but in Japan the E2E 
(End-to-End) type VoIP that does not pass through local exchange is increasing rapidly in 
number, and already covers over 3 million households. Since the “BB phone” manufactured 
by Softbank BB sets a uniform charge across the entire country (free between BB phones, and 
a rate of 7.5 yen for 3 minutes for calls made to non-BB phones) it is only a matter of time 
before NTT’s local telephone business collapses. If the situation is left as it currently stands, 
raising not only the price of interconnection fees but the basic charge would be inevitable, 
creating serious employment problem at NTT, which has more than two hundred thousand 
employees working on a consolidated accounting basis. Thus, after settling the dispute 
regarding the opening of the infrastructure and realizing competition, it became a pressing 
problem what to do with PSTN that has become a negative asset in Japan. 
This is an institutional change that incumbents around the world will face sooner or later, 
and incumbents cannot and should not try to avoid this change. It is, however, important to  16 
minimize the social costs accompanying this change. In particular, the entire regulation 
system bsed on PSTN must be immediately changed. In light of the fact that more than half of 
the total length of the optical fiber in Japan belongs to carriers other than NTT, it is 
undesirable that only NTT’s optical fiber is regulated as the special telecommunication 
equipment to be used by its competitors and national uniform charge system is enforced. 
Moreover, the sharing charge of the subscribers’ line is calculated according to the long-run 
incremental costs used for PSTN. This results in the IP network being allowed an 
impracticably low charge, which encourages competitors to use NTT’s infrastructure by free 
riding and impedes the facility-based competition (Fuke 2003). When the LoopCo has been 
unbundled, the service charge should be left fundamentally at the mercy of market pressures, 
although the equal access needs to be regulated. The individual issues and problems between 
carriers can be solved among the parties through a complaint commission. If NTT takes a 
monopolistic position in a region, government intervention may be necessary. These 
principles accord with usual competition policy, so it is desirable that the current remit and 
responsibility of the staff of the Telecommunication Business Department of the MPHPT will 
be absorbed in the Fair Trade Commission of Japan. 
Moreover, now that the subscriber line is shared by 95% of the regions across the country 
and the VoIP of the E2E type that pass through the local exchanges has grown so rapidly, the 
exchanges are no longer essential facilities and consequently it is necessary to abolish 
interconnection fee regulations. Since the system of charging interconnection fee to the local 
network for each call is incompatible with the flat rate system of VoIP, the telephone charge 
system had better eliminated. If the tariff regulation is abolished, the charge may rise in the 
short term, but this will serve to promote a substitution to the E2E VoIP
21. If all the networks 
are migrated into IP and it becomes possible to interconnect all users without telephone 
exchange, VoIP will finally become a free service (if you estimate a telephone charge of 
about 30 kbps in proportion to the current service of 26 Mbps that is provided at a rate around 
3,000 yen/month, the future telephone charge would be 3 yen/month). Regulating  inter- 
connection fees will tie VoIP to PSTN and prolong the inefficient state where two kinds of 
networks overlap. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The current situation of communications industry recalls that of computer industry in the 
1980s, when mainframe computers were displaced by personal computers. The management 
crisis within NTT created by the advent of DSL, which the company failed to take sufficiently 
seriously, mirrors what happened at IBM, whose business bedrock was undermined by clones 
of the PC that IBM had launched as a niche business. When IBM’s virtual monopoly 
(exceeding 70% of the aggregate market value of the computer business) collapsed, an 
explosion of innovation arose. The scale of the computer industry (including software) grew 
more than ten times, although IBM’s share fell to less than one-tenth of the total market. 
Similarly, while the telecommunications industry in the narrowest sense is not a growing 
industry, and forecasts indicate that migration to IP will reduce the scale of its sales basis to 
                                                  
21  Note, however, that the interconnection of the Internet (peer-to-peer) does not guarantee a fair charge system. 
As long as NTT maintains a monopoly on the core network, it may impose unfairly high connection charges on 
“grassroots” ISPs whose bargaining powers are weak; as such, a degree of supervision is required.  17 
less than one-tenth of the present volume, it is obvious that an information industry based on 
the cheap infrastructure will become far larger than it is at present. If value shifts from the 
industry core to its edges and communications equipment is commoditized, as seen with 
computers which were once shared by users at computer centers, users themselves will invest 
in equipment, not telephone operators. 
This change, while desirable for consumers, would come at great social costs. Of particular 
significance is the problem of what to do with PSTN that could not be sustained on a 
commercial basis. It is advisable to consider the extent to which the universal service of 
PSTN is necessary in a society whose means of communication have become so diverse. 
Even given the provision that a minimum number of lines, such as the ones used for 
emergency calls, need to be sustained, it would be efficient to augment such services with 
cellular phones in mountainous areas and on islands. The primary universal requirement is the 
services, not the facility of PSTN. An addition issue is the question of who should shoulder 
the cost of universal services. NTT regional companies currently bear the burden of operating 
universal services, but considering the financial health of the regional companies, this scheme 
is nearing its limit. Nevertheless, it would be an anachronism to establish a “universal service 
fund” and to ask NCC (New Common Carriers) to bear the burden. Since the PSTN is of 
negative asset value, a means of separating and liquidating it should be established in 
preference to the investment of new capital. An alternative method would be separating the 
telephone services (except local loop) from other department of NTT and transferring it to a 
government-owned “universal service company” that would be liquidated in the long run 
(Ikeda-Hayashi 2001). 
Whatever the solution, NTT’s managerial form should be decided by its shareholders and 
executives. The development of the communications industry is falling behind that of the 
computer industry because the strong regulation makes political lobbying the top agenda of 
telecommunication industry, which seriously distorts incentives of management. As described 
above, semi-governmental managerial forms like the one presently employed at NTT may be 
useful as a transitional measure during an institutional change, but, once competition begins 
to increase, this system only serves to hinder the company’s response to competition and 
destroys its corporate value. It is unusual that government continues to retain half of the 
stocks of privatized company for almost twenty years. The NTT Law must be abolished to 
allow NTT to be privatized completely. Now that the national level of competition is realized, 
there is no reason for government to control NTT directly. 
Although structural changes of the communication industry appear to have suffered a 
setback following the collapse of the IT bubble, the course of innovation is still progressing; it 
is conceivable that an explosion in the rate of change will take place once again if significant 
reforms occur in the regulation of the radio spectrum. In order to make this a reality, it is 
essential to terminate the government’s influence over the communication industry and 
replace it with an ordinary business structure based on market mechanisms. In this 
environment, the fact that Japan’s communication industry is shifting from the telephone to IP 
based networks ahead of other countries poses a major challenge for future policy decisions. 
Although the regulation of policy will be difficult, the government can play a major role in 
this work. While very few regulatory matters can be deemed creative work, Japan’s current 
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